--------------------------------------------
On Tue, 6/16/15, Greg Chalik <xxxxxx@gmail.com> wrote:

 Subject: Re: [TML] Question
 To: "xxxxxx@simplelists.com" <xxxxxx@simplelists.com>
 Date: Tuesday, June 16, 2015, 10:52 PM

 >Well we all
 have our hypotheses but I never found the soviet ones to be
 any more valid or
 realistic than NATO ones.<

 Sorry Phil, but I'm not sure what this relates to.

 >I 'do' remember all the
 'hand-wringing'  & worrying just before
 the 1st Gulf War that turned out to be grossly unfounded
 & also remember
 that the US M1 tank faced criticism from some quarters even
 before it was
 deployed.

 What you don't seem to realize is that one can come up a
 theory/hypothesis that
 pretty much justifies anything or everything.

 The soviets were very good at that sort of
 'theorizing'.

 Actually executing it in practice is quite a different
 story.

 p.s. I also remember when folks were talking about "the
 death of the MBT
 as a viable battlefield instrument" 'cuz
 improvements in HEAT warheads
 rendered their armor so vulnerable. But then
 'chobham' armor was invented (by
 the brits, I believe) & the calculus was
 altered.<

 The M1 was used
 during a very short 100-hour battle operations. There were
 numerous problems
 that were not made public due to the euphoria of Iraqi
 defeat. Would NATO tank
 units have sustained combat against offensively-minded
 Warsaw Pact forces for
 longer?
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
We'll never know but then we'll also never know how well soviet equip, doctrine, & logistics would have fared either.
 We can theorize but we can't know for sure.
===================================

 Neither I not
 the Soviets were theorising.
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^

Sure they were. They were theorizing how future ops would unfold & how to equip their forces in order to prevail.

========================================================================================

 You can ask the
 question why immediately after the war the first
 'IFV' designs produced were
 the BTR-152 and BTR-50. The answer is the same as for BTR-60
 and BMP-1.

 The basis of
 designs was wartime experience that was worked out in the
 1930s, and executed
 in over 70 operational-strategic operations between 1941 and
 1945, admittedly
 with varying, but mostly successful results. By 1945 the Red
 Army had it down
 to a fairly good formula.
 ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^

The theories they 'worked out' in the '30's didn't work out so well when put to the test.
Not even during the 'Winter War' against Finland in 1940 & esp so in 1941.
It took real-life experience to work-out the kinks.
In the end the standard soviet tactics typically involved horrifyingly high casualties that other nations weren't willing to accept as SOP.
=========================================================================

 Chobham armour
 is a noteworthy but not entirely relevant factor in the
 development of correlation of forces in Cold War Europe. It
 matters at the
 tactical employment of forces, but is irrelevant
 operationally.
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^

Well you're the 1st person I've read that has said that.
I'm going to have to side with the numerous others that disagree w/ you.

==========================================================

No one in
 Soviet Union ever talked about the 'death of the
 MBT'.
 ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^

I never said they did.
Still, I encountered many folks (& read a lot more) that consistently beat that drum & then shut up after the new armor appeared.

=============================================================================================
  

 On 17
 June 2015 at 12:19, Phil Pugliese (via tml list) <xxxxxx@simplelists.com>
 wrote:
 This email was sent from yahoo.com which does not allow
 forwarding of emails via email lists. Therefore the
 sender's email address (xxxxxx@yahoo.com)
 has been replaced with a dummy one. The original message
 follows:

 Well we all have our hypotheses but I never found the
 soviet ones to be any more valid or realistic than NATO
 ones.

 I 'do' remember all the 'hand-wringing' 
 & worrying just before the 1st Gulf War that turned out
 to be grossly unfounded & also remember that the US M1
 tank faced criticism from some quarters even before it was
 deployed.

 What you don't seem to realize is that one can come up a
 theory/hypothesis that pretty much justifies anything or
 everything.

 The soviets were very good at that sort of
 'theorizing'.

 Actually executing it in practice is quite a different
 story.

 p.s. I also remember when folks were talking about "the
 death of the MBT as a viable battlefield instrument"
 'cuz improvements in HEAT warheads rendered their armor
 so vulnerable. But then 'chobham' armor was invented
 (by the brits, I believe) & the calculus was altered.

 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

 On Tue, 6/16/15, Greg Chalik
 <xxxxxx@gmail.com>
 wrote:

  Subject: Re: [TML] Question

  To: "xxxxxx@simplelists.com"
 <xxxxxx@simplelists.com>

  Date: Tuesday, June 16, 2015, 5:47 PM

  The thing about Tactics of

  Mistake is that it was written

  based on a very specific real-life ​understandings by

  Gordon Dickson, which are

  those of the Cold and Vietnam

  wars.

   

  However, neither he, nor

  the rest of the NATO professional

  military officer corps understood their enemies.

   

  Bruce is quite right to

  state that "A tank you cannot

  transport to the battlefield because it’s too
 large/heavy

  to use your

  infrastructure is a lump of useless metal. Expensive
 useless

  metal that will

  likely cause your troops to get killed because you

  couldn’t afford the tanks

  that could be transported."

   

  What Phil, and most people

  that write and read about 'tanks'

  (all AFVs) get wrong, is that they are not about
 trade-offs

  in mobility vs

  protection (survivability). In fact the entire
 survivability

  + mobility + lethality

  formula used by the US Army (with other NATO equivalents)
 is

  the least

  important part of the larger equation more pertinent in
 a

  greater-view of the

  Traveller universe: Affordability, Appropriateness,

  Availability, Elegance

  (ingeniously simple design), [Operational reach]
 Efficiency

  and [Tactical]

  Effectiveness (survivability+mobility+lethality). I
 call

  this the A3E3 formula, and the design

  thinking

  based on this as are all other consideration, are
 derived

  from the strategic  considerations that are all about

  the Economy of the society that owns the military
 force,

  whil​e​

  th​e​ critical

  Elegance in design is the
 engineering activity that helps to

  align the

  strategic application of the Efficiency and

  Effectiveness.

   

  The TAM tank was a better

  tank, when seen from the A3E3

  perspective than the M48/M60, Chieftain and the Leopard
 I

  designs.

   

  In terms of NATO

  requirements, the M48/M60 and Chieftain

  were bad designs.

  However, this wasn't

  the ​worst

  ​NATO problem.

   

  The French production of

  wheeled AFVs, including

  anti-tank-capable 'armoured cars' was
 necessitated

  by the strategic depth they

  would have had to transit in order to reach forward areas
 of

  battle in the

  eventuality of the Warsaw Pact attack. Wheels are
 better

  than tracks for this

  mission by the virtue of operational tempo +
 operational

  reach.

   

  T​h​is answers why Germans stopped

  building more heavy
 wheeled

  'armoured cars' in the later stages of the
 Second

  World War. Their strategic

  depth was substantially reduced by 1944, and they also
 lost

  air superiority on

  the Eastern and Western fronts, preventing effective use
 of

  the road networks.

   

  Of course any design are

  misused, but Phil, 'Russians',

  i.e. Soviet designers, didn't design AFVs for use
 in

  'Russia'.

  And, 'Russia' is

  not "You know, endless steppe &

  all that." A cursory look at the map of the Soviet

  Union will show that

  the endless steppe occupies mostly northern Ukraine and

  parts of southern

  Belarus and south-western Russia, i.e. parts not regarded
 as

  where offensives

  will be conducted; AFV design philosophy in Soviet Union
 was

  based on the

  offensive Strategy.

   

  There is a vast

  misunderstanding as to why the Soviet Army

  retained use of wheeled AFVs throughout the Cold War,
 and

  the Russian Army

  continues this.

  The simple explanation is

  that wheeled AFVs offer the

  capability to generate the offensive tempo and exploit

  operational reach that

  tracked-mounted forces can't match and counter.

  The reason tank divisions

  had BMP-mounted regiments is that

  these served as 'sabots', in that they would

  'peel-off' in the breach and

  establish anti-tank zones along the breakthrough path.

  BMP-mounted units are

  not really 'infantry' despite the vehicle's

  name, but anti-tank since 3/4 of

  the BMP crew and passengers are anti-tank weapon

  operators/users.

  The tank divisions however

  would follow in the wake of the

  Motor-rifle regimental Operational Manoeuvre Groups
 which

  were BTR-mounted to

  exploit West German autobahns and road networks. NATO
 forces

  were uniquely

  badly designed to cope with fast-moving wheeled
 opponents

  because by late 1960s

  false-economies thinking converted most of the NATO
 forces

  to being

  track-mounted.

  There was also a

  false-belief in air power to interdict

  these penetrations, but this was unwarranted because it

  didn't come with

  appropriate FFI technology.

   

  I'm going to leave the

  issue of the German use of captured

  T-34s for now. The short answer is that their
 discontinued

  use had more to do with

  cultural bias and lack of suitable ammunition than
 actual

  T-34 design.

   

  To get back to the TAM, it

  was far from helpless,

  particularly when the 105mm APFSDS ammunition became

  available.

  The thing about anti-tank

  tactics is that it doesn't

  necessarily require a 0-warning meeting engagement
 EVERY

  TIME to validate the

  heavy frontal armour tank design. Both the Germans and
 the

  Soviets during the

  Second World War successfully used lightly armoured

  anti-tank designs that

  fought from ambush positions in a combined arms
 tactical

  setting.

   

  To quote Wayne P. Hughes,

  a naval officer, "doctrine is

  the glue of good tactics." and "To know
 tactics,

  you must know

  weapons."

  Neither Gordon R. Dickson,

  nor Lieutenant Colonel Cletus

  Grahame knew either, but Dickson was a very good
 writer.

   

  On a final note, the F-35

  is a failed design. Those that

  care to learn the program history would know that the
 F-35

  started as a

  post-Vietnam project to design a single engine to serve
 both

  services that use

  jet aircraft, the 'universal engine'. The F-35
 has

  this been in development

  since mid-1970s. The engine project was rolled into one

  closed (defunded)

  program after another, gathering other projects like
 flint

  to a comb, until it

  grew into a Joint Service Fighter.

   

  Based on the A3E3 it is

  unaffordable to fly, so no further

  progress should have been made by late 90s when first

  realistic cost estimates

  were voiced and told to shut up. Lockheed-Martin
 current

  statement is that

  "An F-35A purchased in 2018 and delivered in 2020
 will

  be $85 million,

  which is the equivalent of $75 million in today’s

  dollars." To quote ADM.

  Mike Boorda "Occasionally it would be good if the

  target cost more than

  the bullet." A Su-27/35 as the most likely F-35A

  opponent in the next 20

  years costs US$30/65 million. A MiG-29 is US$29 million.
 It

  is not at all clear

  based on some simulation models that the F-35 can
 defeat

  advanced versions of

  either of these airframes (or their Chinese copies)
 when

  numerically

  outnumbered.

  It is an inappropriate

  design because a combat aircraft is

  not an analogy of a Swiss Army knife. It’s a design
 that

  is over two decades

  late in full service, which is not unusual for the US
 DoD

  where the average

  program delivery for a major system has been about 18
 years

  since the

  mid-1960s. However, with aircraft, the airframes are
 not

  subject to

  reconditioning. Unknown to most, there is a steady
 issuing

  of contracts to

  replace entire parts of F-16s and F-15s because they can
 no

  longer be quality

  assured in flight. This should be attributed to the cost
 of

  the F-35 delivery

  delay that would increase the F-35 costs substantially
 over

  the production

  costs quoted above. Worst of all, the F-35 is anything
 but

  ingeniously simple

  as a design. Structural tolerances are such that ANY

  internal damage would

  effectively end aircraft's participation in combat
 for

  weeks even if it

  survives to land because repair requires technological

  qualifications way

  outside normal combat operations as practiced for the

  previous generations of

  aircraft.

  ​On a final note,

  mercenaries generally fight with what they have rather
 than

  what they want to have. Their 'saving grace' is
 the

  necessity of a want, necessity being the mother of

  invention. Military history proves that forces denied

  'advanced technology' of their opponents are
 more

  likely to be victorious due to greater need to
 innovate.

  This perhaps presents a paradox for the Traveller
 universe

  that a force with more advanced technology is more likely
 to

  be defeated​​.​

  ​Greg​

  On 16

  June 2015 at 23:58, Doug Grimes <xxxxxx@gmail.com>

  wrote:

  --------

  Original
 message --------------------------------------------On

  Tue, 6/16/15, xxxxxx@shadowgard.com

  <xxxxxx@shadowgard.com>

  wrote:

   Subject: Re: [TML]

  Question

   To: xxxxxx@simplelists.com

   Date: Tuesday, June 16, 2015, 12:01 AM

   On 15 Jun 2015 at 18:07,

   Richard Aiken wrote:

   >

   On Mon, Jun 15, 2015 at

  3:47 PM, Leslie Bates (via tml list)

   > <xxxxxx@simplelists.com>

   wrote:

   >

  > 

      Is there a site that describes

  the

   organization of fictional ground

   > 

      force Dorsai

  units?

   I know that one of

  the books gives some info on

   units

  organization.

   Most likely Tactics of

   Mistake.

  Can't be more

   specific because I made

  those notes back in the 70s.

   --

   Leonard

  Erickson (aka shadow)

   shadow at

  shadowgard

   dot com

  ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^

  I don't recall that

  'Tactics of Mistake' actually mentioned the

  dorsai.

  As I recall, it was

  an Army veteran (w/ a MOH!) from earth that used
 various

  trickery & misdirection accomplish his goals..

  Also, the earth was still

  'balkanized' politically..

  ===============================================================================================

  Tactics of Mistake

  was where that veteran founded the organized mercenary

  culture of the Dorsai. They'd been a planet of

  mercenaries before that, known as being better than
 average

  but still fairly disorganized beyond the company or
 even

  battalion level.

  Doug Grimes

  -----

  The Traveller Mailing List

  Archives at http://archives.simplelists.com/tml

  Report problems to xxxxxx@travellercentral.com

  To unsubscribe from this list please goto

  http://archives.simplelists.com

  -----

  The Traveller Mailing List

  Archives at http://archives.simplelists.com/tml

  Report problems to xxxxxx@travellercentral.com

  To unsubscribe from this list please goto

  http://archives.simplelists.com

 -----

 The Traveller Mailing List

 Archives at http://archives.simplelists.com/tml

 Report problems to xxxxxx@travellercentral.com

 To unsubscribe from this list please goto

 http://archives.simplelists.com

 -----
 The Traveller Mailing List
 Archives at http://archives.simplelists.com/tml
 Report problems to xxxxxx@travellercentral.com
 To unsubscribe from this list please goto
 http://www.simplelists.com/confirm.php?u=EwREIRgLK8vaUEhNlnoNdSGKwnjoID8a